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Case No. 20030373-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a judgment and conviction of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.6 (Supp. 2003); and Driving on Suspended or Revoked Driver's License, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(1998), and Failure to 
Secure New Registration and New Certificate of Title for her automobile, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-703(2002), the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996 & Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly determine that it was proper for the 
Monticello Chief of Police to testify concerning the amount of methamphetamine 
typically possessed for personal use? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling concerning the admissibility of opinion 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Perkins v. Fit-Well Artificial 
Limb Co., 514 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1973) ("The trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in 
his control over the examination of witnesses - lay and expert alike"). 
Issue 2: Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to sustain defendant's 
conviction on all five counts of the information? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is clear error. 
However, because defendant has not briefed this issue, it should be deemed waived. See, 
e.g., State v. Bartlett, 2004 UT App 103 (Memorandum Decision) (Addendum A); Pixton 
v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in full in 
Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (Supp. 2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003); 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested following a traffic stop in Monticello, Utah, on September 
23, 2002. R. 141:54. On September 26, 2002, she was charged by information with one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii)(Supp. 2003); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2003); driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (Supp. 
2003); driving on suspended or revoked driver's license, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(l)(1998);and Failure to secure new registration 
and new certificate of title for her automobile, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-703(2002). Following a one-day jury trial, defendant was 
convicted on all counts. R. 90. On May 19, 2003, defendant received a one-to-15-year 
prison term, 12 months in jail, a fine of $925 and 36 months probation. R. 115-17. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 118. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The confession 
When arresting officers discovered methamphetamine in her car, defendant did not 
hesitate to admit that the drugs belonged to her. R. 141:61, 71. She also acknowledged 
3 
that a gym bag containing scales and baggies belonged to her. R. 141:69. And when 
asked how often she used methamphetamine, defendant responded "[o]nce a day," then 
corrected herself. "No, twice/' she said. R. 141:89. She even admitted she had used the 
drug earlier in the day, an assertion confirmed laboratory analysis performed on her urine. 
R. 141:61-62. 
These revelations, all offered following a proper Miranda warning, were revealed 
during an encounter with Monticello police officers, an encounter that began 
inauspiciously when Officer Jim Eberling observed a vehicle driving erratically and 
decided to investigate. R. 141:50. The vehicle crossed the center dotted line in the road, 
overcorrected and swerved across the outside fog line before finally pulling off the road. 
Id Officer Eberling pulled up behind the vehicle and turned on his overhead lights. Id. 
Officer Eberling spoke with defendant, the driver of the vehicle, and asked her if 
she was all right. Id. She replied that she had been driving a long time and was tired. R. 
141:50-51. After apparently finding no obvious signs of intoxication, the officer 
concluded the traffic stop and returned to his vehicle as defendant drove away. R. 141:51. 
However, Officer Eberling pulled defendant over again a short time later after 
checking the car's license plates and learning that they had expired, even though the 
registration sticker on the plate indicated it did not expire for several months. Id. After 
stopping the vehicle, Officer Eberling checked defendant's driver's license and learned 
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that it was suspended. Id. He then arrested her for driving on a suspended license and 
placed her in his squad car. R. 141:53. 
Officer Eberling then returned to the car and asked a passenger, Kevin 
Rothlisberger,1 to exit so the officer could perform a search. Id. The officer immediately 
discovered a small baggy containing a white, powdery substance on the console between 
the driver and passenger seats. Id. Officer Eberling suspected the substance in the bag 
was methamphetamine. Id. He also discovered the gym bag in the back seat of the car 
that contained drug scales, which were covered with a white residue, and several baggies. 
R. 141:59. Eberling arrested Rothlisberger. R. 141:54. 
About that time, Monticello Police Chief Kent Adair arrived to assist Officer 
Eberling. R. 141:83. Chief Adair noted that Rothlisberger acted very nervous when 
officers came near the passenger side door. R. 85. While searching the passenger side of 
the vehicle, Chief Adair discovered a second baggy stuffed inside a toilet paper roll, 
which was concealed by a pair of men's jeans stuffed into the passenger-side door panel. 
R. 141:85. Analysis later determined the bag in fact contained 32 grams of 
methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100. Chief Adair then checked the pockets of the jeans 
and discovered a "little bottle with a snort tube attached," a device used to both store and 
use methamphetamine. R. 141:86. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the device were 
1
 Rothlisberger was also convicted of possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine and has appealed. See Case No. 20030494-CA. 
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his. R. 141:97. Rothlisberger also admitted that he and defendant had both used 
methamphetamine earlier that day. R. 141:88. 
An amicable arrest 
Following their arrest, defendant and Althoff were highly cooperative, 
volunteering information about their use and purchasing of methamphetamine. 
Rothlisberger also admitted he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day and that the 
snort tube discovered in the search belonged to him. R. 141:87-88. Defendant, too, was 
forthcoming, acknowledging the methamphetamine had been purchased in Bluff. R. 
141:69. 
Despite their candor, they did not volunteer the location of the drugs, which 
officers had to discover on their own. The first baggy containing a small amount of 
methamphetamine was quickly discovered in plain view between the driver and passenger 
seats. R. 141:53-54. Eberling also found a gym bag in the back seat of the car that 
contained drug scales, which were covered with a white residue, and several baggies. R. 
141:59. A second baggy of methamphetamine was discovered by Monticello Police 
Chief Kent Adair, who, after arriving to assist in the arrest, observed that Rothlisberger 
acted very nervous while Officer Eberling searched the front passenger seat. R. 141:83, 
85. 
"I went over and told Jim - Officer Eberling - that whatever he was looking for 
was in the front passenger seat," Chief Adair recalled. R. 141:85. 
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Chief Adair discovered the second baggy inside a toilet paper roll hidden 
underneath a pair of men's pants that had been stuffed into the door panel on the 
passenger's side of the car. R. 141:84-85. Analysis later determined the baggy contained 
nearly 32 grams of methamphetamine. R. 141:58, 100. 
With the discovery of these additional items, defendants resumed their candid 
acknowledgment of culpability. Rothlisberger admitted the pants and the snort tube 
discovered in the pocket were his. R. 141:97. He told Chief Adair, '"I got that [the 
device] - I've had that or I got that in my divorce,' or 'I've had that since my divorce.'" 
R. 141:87. Defendant claimed that all of the "crystal meth" was hers and that defendant 
knew nothing about it. R. 141:61. 
Preliminary Hearing 
Both officers testified at Rothlisberger's and defendant's preliminary hearing. See 
R. 214 (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, held December 2, 2002 ). After testifying to 
the events up to and including the arrest and search, Eberling was asked whether, in his 
opinion, the drugs found in the car were for personal use or for distribution. R. 214:18-
19. 
[MR. HALLS]: Officer, have you had drug cases where 
people have had methamphetamine that you believe to be for 
personal use? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell me about the quantity and how 
packaged, how it's kept when it's in that condition? 
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A. Usually when it's for personal use it's like that first 
baggy I found that was on the console. That's pretty 
common. Small, small amounts in a small bag. 
Q. You have charged her [Althoff] with possession with 
the intent to distribute. Why do you feel like this is a 
distribution case? 
A. The scales that I believe were used are for drugs. The 
plastic bags for packaging the 31-2 grams or 1.1 ounces of 
meth in the small - in the bag that was found in the passenger 
door. That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and 
the baggies, I believe that's for distribution. 
Id. This testimony was admitted without objection. Id. 
Trial 
At trial, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair again testified about the bust and the 
significance of the quantities found in the car. Testimony concerning the significance of 
the quantities of methamphetamine was first elicited by counsel for Rothlisberger during 
cross-examination of Officer Eberling. 
[MS. REILLY]: I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right here 
was what you found on the console, right? 
[OFFICER EBERLING]: Yes. 
Q. That was with a small amount? 
A. Uh-huh.. 
Q. Is that characteristic of what's sold? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. It is. What - 1 mean you testified you believed it was for sale 
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)? 
A. I don't -
R. 141:64. 
During his testimony, Chief Adair commented generally on the significance of 
quantities of methamphetamine. 
[MR. HALLS]: Chief Adair, have you had an occasion in 
your experience to look or see how methamphetamine is 
usually packaged as far as - when you have found 
methamphetamine in your experience (inaudible) have you 
found times when people have had personal use amounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How is it usually packaged or what is the quantity? 
A. A quarter or half grams [sic], right in there. Maybe 
even at the most a gram. . . . 
Q. Do you have -- through your training and experience, 
do you know commonly what somebody would buy if they 
were to go out on the street buy some right now, what would 
they usually get for personal use? . . . 
A. In our undercover investigations when we buy from 
individuals, we usually buy a quarter or a half a gram. 
Q. Have you ever found in your experience that someone 
who had personal quantities of methamphetamine to have 
scales? 
A. It's not common, no. 
9 
Q. Do you know what those kind of items are used for 
other than - have you seen these kinds of baggies where you 
have found methamphetamine? 
A. Yes . . . . It's quite common with methamphetamine, 
cocaine and those drugs in small quantities. You don't see 
that with marijuana. 
Q. Have you ever - have you seen scales like this before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what context? 
A. Usually people that have quantities of drugs have 
scales. 
R. 141:90-92. 
Defense attorneys objected to this testimony, claiming it was "expert testimony" 
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and, as such, was improper because the State had 
not given the defense 30 days advance notice, as required by statute.2 R. 141:104-05. 
The trial court overruled the objection, holding that Chief Adair testified as a "lay 
witness" under rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows opinion testimony that 
"would be rationally based on his perception, and would be helpful to a clear 
understanding or determination of the facts and issues." R. 141:105. 
2
 Defense attorneys apparently made this objection during an unrecorded side-bar 
conference, then articulated the basis for the objection later outside the presence of the 
jury. R. 141:90, 104-08. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly admitted Chief Adair's testimony concerning the 
significance of different quantities of drugs. The State named Chief Adair as a witness 
long before trial and defendant was well aware she would have to counter testimony 
concerning the significance of the drug quantities. Moreover, contrary to defendant's 
claim that Chief Adair testified as an expert, the testimony is more aptly viewed as lay 
opinion testimony, which is admissible under Utah R. Evid. 701, or simply as statements 
of fact admissible without appeal to rules governing opinion testimony. Alternatively, 
even assuming Chief Adair testified as an expert, the notice requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a) were met because the same testimony was offered at defendant's 
preliminary hearing by Officer Eberling. Finally, even assuming the testimony was 
improperly admitted, defendant cannot show prejudice because Officer Eberling's 
testimony put defendant on notice that such testimony would likely be presented at trial 
and defendant, thus, had ample opportunity to prepare for rebuttal. Defendant's claim of 
surprise is especially hollow given that he opened the door by eliciting testimony from 
Officer Eberling concerning the significance of the quantities of methamphetamine. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED CHIEF ADAIR'S 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
DIFFERENT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing Chief Adair's testimony 
concerning the significance of the drug quantities. Aplt. Br. at 8-12.3 "Either Adair's 
testimony was violative of [defendant's] discovery or statutory rights or Adair is not an 
expert and should not have been allowed to give testimony about distribution." Id. at 8. 
This argument fails. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in overruling her objections to Adair's 
testimony because the content of his testimony concerning drug quantities was not 
disclosed to the defense, although Adair's name was on a witness list provided by the 
State to defendant. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. This claim is premised on two legal theories. First, 
defendant claims that rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required the State to 
disclose that Adair would be called as a witness and the substance of his testimony. Id. at 
9-11. Second, she claims that Adair's testimony was expert testimony under rule 702, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, which required the State to provide Adair's name, a copy of his 
3
 This claim is unpreserved because defendant did not argue at trial that the state 
violated rule 16. Thus, this claim can only be reversed on a showing of plain error. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). To demonstrate plain error, defendant must 
show that error occurred, that it was obvious and that it was harmful. State v. Adams, 955 
P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1998). Defendant has not even claimed plain error, let alone 
demonstrated it. 
12 
vitae and a written explanation of his testimony. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). 
These arguments are meritless. 
A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Allowing 
Chief Adair to Testify About the Drug Quantities. 
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Adair to testify 
about drug quantities because Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required the 
State to disclose not only Adair's name but also the substance of his testimony. Rule 
16(a) states that, upon request, the prosecutor must disclose (1) written or recorded 
statements of the defendant, (2) his or her criminal record, (3) physical evidence, (4) 
exculpatory evidence and (5) "any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense." Although not specifically required, a party's discovery 
duties typical include disclosure of a witness list. Although the State provided defendant 
with a witness list that included Chief Adair, defendant still complains that the State 
should have detailed his testimony concerning drug quantities. Aplt. Br. at 8-11. 
This claim fails, first, because it was not preserved and defendant does not argue 
plain error. Although the record does not specifically identify the basis for the objection, 
it is clear that the objection is based on Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a), which requires 
at least 30-days notice to opposing parties for expert witnesses. Because the claim is not 
preserved, defendant must show plain error to prevail. 
13 
Second, defendant's claim of a discovery violation fails because she was well-
aware of most of Adair's testimony because he testified at the preliminary hearing. See, 
e.g, State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 25, 989 P.2d 52 ("'[T]here is substantial authority that 
the prosecutor cannot be cited for a discovery violation where the defendant had 
knowledge of the existence of the item that the State failed to disclose'") (citing State v. 
White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo. App.1996)). The only addition to Adair's testimony 
at trial were his brief comments concerning the amounts of methamphetamine typically 
possessed by users, its street value and that users generally do not possess scales. R. 
141:90-92. This testimony covers the same ground as the testimony given by Officer 
Eberling at the preliminary hearing that users generally have "small, small amounts [of 
meth] in a small bag," while the scales and baggies discovered in defendant's car were for 
repackaging and selling the drugs. R. 214:18-19. Because defendant was aware, from 
the preliminary hearing, that she would have to rebut testimony concerning the 
significance of the drug amounts, she cannot now complain she was not provided 
information she already had. Thus, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to 
exclude Chief Adair's testimony on the Accordingly, defendant's claims are meritless. 
B. Chief Adair's Testimony was Either Lay Opinion or 
Statements of Fact; In Either Case, It was not Expert 
Testimony and did not Require 30-days Notice. 
Next, defendant claims Adair's testimony should have been excluded because it 
was expert testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the State had not 
14 
provided adequate notice for such testimony. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11. Under Utah law, 
a party intending to call an expert witness "shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). "If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-13(3).4 
First, defendant's argument fails because she did not request a continuance. Under 
the notice statute, a party is entitled a continuance, but only if she asks for one. State v. 
Perez, 2002 UT App 211, % 41, 52 P.3d 451 ("In the absence of a request, the trial court 
had no duty to order a continuance"). Although defendant's trial counsel objected to the 
introduction of Chief Adair's testimony, she did not request the only relief provided for in 
the statute.5 Thus, she cannot now fault the court for failing to do what she failed to 
request. 
4
 The wording of this statute was substantially changed in 2003 to read: "If the 
defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled 
to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the 
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4)(a) (emphasis added to highlight new 
language). This version became effective May 5, 2003. 
5
 The only remedy available absent a showing of bad faith. See 77-17-13(4)(b) ("If 
the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the 
part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of 
exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if the court finds that a party 
deliberately violated the provisions of this section"). 
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Second defendant's claim fails because Chief Adair was not testifying as an 
"expert." The Utah Rules of Evidence, like similar rules in virtually every state and 
federal court, recognize two kinds of opinion testimony - expert and lay. Rule 702, 
which applies to expert witnesses, states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Rule 701 states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that witnesses who testify about matters 
that may be subject to scientific analysis are not necessarily expert witnesses under Rule 
702. In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed defendant's claim that a security guard who testified that footprints discovered 
outside of a burglarized residence appeared to be the same as those inside. Id. at 190. 
The defendant claimed that admission of this testimony was improper because the guard 
did not have the expertise to offer an opinion on the footprints. Id. The Supreme Court 
soundly rejected this claim, holding that: 
16 
It is difficult to understand how [the guard's] lay testimony in 
the form of an opinion became expert testimony. Simply 
because a question might be capable of scientific 
determination, helpful lay testimony touching on the issue and 
based on personal observation does not become expert 
opinion. It is true that if a question is capable of scientific 
determination, then expert testimony is admissible with 
respect to i t . . . ; however, that does not mean that lay opinion 
testimony is prohibited if the provisions of the evidentiary 
rule are met. 
Id at 191 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 978 (3rd Cir. 1986) (government witness's testimony concerning 
his understanding of extortion defendant's ambiguous statements is permissible lay 
opinion testimony); Fairley v. State, 2003 WL 22724713, So. 2d , ^  16 (Miss.)6 
(police officer's testimony concerning workings of a gun is lay, not expert testimony); 
Harris v. Dist. of Columbia, 601 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. App. 1991) (police officers may offer 
opinion on intoxication or impairment by drugs without qualifying as an expert); State v. 
Rubio, 798 P.2d 206, 207 (N.M. App. 1990) (cocaine dealer may offer lay opinion 
testimony identifying cocaine and marijuana); see also Chess v. State, 357 S.W.2d 386, 
387-88 (Tex. Cr. App. 1962) (police officer may testify on smell of marijuana without 
being qualified as an expert); Provo City v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 442-43 (Utah App. 
1993) (officer may offer lay testimony that substance was marijuana based on "distinctive 
aroma" and defendant's bloodshot eyes and slow speech). 
6
 Westlaw citation pending. 
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Similarly, Chief Adair's testimony, although perhaps amenable to expert treatment, 
was properly admitted as lay opinion testimony. Chief Adair testified that in his personal 
experience those who possess methamphetamine for personal use generally have less than 
a gram. R. 141:91-92. He also stated that "[u]sually people that have quantities of drugs 
have scales." Id. at 92. These "opinions," if they are such, were "rationally based on the 
perception of the witness and . . . helpful to a clear understanding of the witness5 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 701. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. 
Alternatively, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible because his statements were 
not opinions at all, but statements of fact.7 Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the 
trial court when asked to reconsider the same issues in a post-trial motion by 
Rothlisberger for a certificate of probable cause. R. 211-13. "The testimony] actually 
turned out to be neither expert testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony 
about Adair's actual experiences." R. 212. A number of courts have taken this view of 
testimony involving descriptions of the drug trade drawn from law enforcement officers 
experience. See, e.g, United States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1996) (law 
7
 Indeed, this was the conclusion of the court when asked to reconsider the 
question during a post-trial motion filed by co-defendant Rothlisberger. The court states: 
"As it turned out[,] Adair actually testified only that, in his experience, individual 
packages of methamphetamine hold only fractions of a gram, that each contains two to 
eight doses, that individual users usually do not have scales and that dealers use small 
baggies to package their produce for sale. That [testimony] actually turned out to be 
neither expert testimony or lay opinion testimony, but merely testimony about Adair's 
actual experiences." State v. Rothlisberger, Case No. 20030494-CA, R. at 212. 
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enforcement agent's testimony concerning practices within drug trade not opinion 
testimony); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) ("This testimony was not 
opinion testimony at all, but a simple recitation of an observed phenomenon: the price 
paid for the coins5'); Davenport v. United States, 197 F.2d 157, 158 (5th Cir. 1952) 
(officer's testimony concerning item of drug paraphernalia called a "finger stall" "was 
neither immaterial nor a conclusion. The witness was not asked to give his opinion as to 
the use was made or intended to be made of the particular finger stall found. In 
connection with his testimony as to finding it, he was asked, and testified, about the 
nature and uses of finger stalls as he had observed them in his work as a narcotic officer. 
The answers made were relevant and factual, and it was not error to admit them in 
evidence"). 
In DiMarzo, the investigating agent, like Chief Adair, was one of the arresting 
officers and testified about the "sting" operation resulting in the arrest of defendant and 
others. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d at 658-59. The agent also testified concerning practices in the 
drug trade, such as whether drug crime participants generally carry guns and whether 
innocent observers are invited to drug transactions. Id. at 659. The defendant claimed on 
appeal that this was improperly admitted expert testimony because the prosecutors had 
not provided proper notice under the federal rules. Id. The court rejected this contention, 
holding that the agent's testimony 
expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion, as distinguished 
from a statement of fact as to what [the agent] had witnessed 
during his 29 years in law enforcement. As the challenged 
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testimony proffered no opinion, lay or expert, but simply the 
witness's personal experience relating to a subject bearing 
directly upon the appropriateness of a jury inference,... we 
reject the claim. 
Id. at 659-60 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
Chief Adair similarly drew on his 20 years of law enforcement experience in 
noting that those who possess methamphetamine for personal use usually have less than a 
gram and generally do not have scales. Chief Adair never took the additional step of 
opining that because of his experience, he believes that defendant possessed the drugs 
with intent to distribute. In short, Chief Adair offered no opinion on the significance of 
the quantities of methamphetamine possessed by defendant. Thus, whether viewed as 
opinion or simply statements of fact, Chief Adair's testimony was admissible. 
C. Even Assuming Chief Adair Offered Expert Testimony, 
Defendant Received Proper Notice Because the Same 
Testimony was Admitted at the Preliminary Hearing. 
Even if defendant is correct in characterizing Chief Adair's comments as expert 
testimony, defendant received proper notice under the statute. Under Utah law, the party 
proposing to use expert testimony must provide notice to the opposing party at least 30 
days before trial. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). However, if the same expert 
testimony is provided at the defendant's preliminary hearing, the law deems the notice 
requirements to have been met. states: 
[Testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing held 
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, 
and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the 
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subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary 
hearing. 
The purpose of this rule is clear: To ensure parties have adequate time to prepare 
to rebut expert testimony. State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1167, 1170 (Utah App.1998); 
see also State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985). As one court noted: "The general 
purpose of establishing a pretrial sequencing of disclosure for expert testimony is to 
provide parties with adequate notice for purposes of effective cross-examination and an 
opportunity for submission of contradicting evidence-in-chief." Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of New Jersey, Inc., v. Philip Morris, Inc., etal, 199 F.R.D. 484, 487 (E.D.N. Y. 
2001). Moreover, this policy is explicitly embodied in the newest version of the statute, 
which requires only that a party "substantially comply" with its requirements and provides 
for a continuance only "if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-13(4)(a) (effective May 5, 2003). 
The Utah Supreme Court analysis of another notice statute is consistent with this 
principle. In State v. Ortiz, the court reversed a trial court ruling granting the State's 
motion to exclude an alibi witness because the defense had not provided the statutorily 
required notice 10 days before trial. Id., 112 P.2d at 219. The defense had properly 
notified State that there were two alibi witnesses, one of whom would testify at trial, but 
designated a different witness eight days before trial when the original witness could not 
be found. Id. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no 
basis for concluding that the substitution of Revas for Crisbo would have created any 
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unfair surprise or worked any undue hardship on the State.. . . Surely the State knew that 
the alibi witness called by the defense, whether Crisbo or Revas, would corroborate this 
version of the facts." 
Similarly, in Reed v. United States, 828 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. App. 2003), 
prosecutors disclosed the names and qualifications of two possible experts and provided 
extensive background information and details concerning their proposed testimony ten 
months before trial. Reed, 828 A.2d at 161. On the day the expert was to testify, the 
prosecutor informed defense counsel that the expert was not one of the two disclosed 
earlier. Id. at 163. Defendant claimed the substitution of new expert violated the state 
notice statute. Id. The trial court rejected this challenge and the appellate court affirmed. 
Id. The appellate court noted that the disclosure of the substance of the expert's 
testimony left defendant "well-armed" for cross examination. Id. 
Defendant in this case was equally well-armed for cross examining Chief Adair 
because the same testimony was provided at defendant's preliminary hearing, albeit 
through a different police officer. At defendant's preliminary hearing on December 2, 
2002, both Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified concerning the events preceding 
defendant's arrest, but only Eberling testified concerning the significance of drug 
quantities. Officer Eberling testified that those who possess methamphetamine for 
personal use generally have "[s]mall, small amounts in a small bag." R. 214:18-19. He 
also testified that, by contrast, the amount seized from the car in which defendant was 
riding - nearly 32 grams - was many times the amount needed for personal use. Id. 
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"That's a quantity that's saleable, and with the scale and the baggies, I believe that's for 
distribution." Id.8 
At trial, the State elicited testimony concerning the significance of the amount of 
drugs from Chief Adair. Chief Adair stated that the amount of meth typically possessed 
for personal use is "[a] quarter or half grams, right in there. Maybe even at the most a 
gram. .. ." He also said that those who use meth would have little use for scales. 
"[P]eople that have quantities of drugs have scales." R. 141:90, 91-92. 
Because Chief Adair's testimony at trial was substantively identical to Officer 
Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing, defendant cannot claim surprise. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the notice statute were met and the admission of Chief 
Adair's testimony was proper. 
D. Defendant has not Demonstrated Prejudice. 
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Chief Adair's 
testimony and Officer Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing did not place 
defendant on notice, defendant cannot show substantial prejudice. To prevail on her claim, 
defendant must plausibly demonstrate how she would have prevailed if she had received the 
30-day notice required by statute. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,120, n.3, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Defendant has not and cannot make this showing. Defendant knew from the preliminary 
8
 Because Eberling expresses his belief that the quantity indicates defendant 
intended to distribute the drug, his testimony arguably could be considered opinion 
testimony under the analysis outlined in section I.A., above. By contrast, Chief Adair 
never expresses an opinion concerning whether defendant intended to distribute. 
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hearing that she would have to rebut testimony concerning the significance of various 
quantities of drugs. Despite this advance notice, defendant did not request an expert report, a 
curriculum vitae or any other information about Officer Eberling, even though she had every 
right and ample opportunity to do so if she believed the officer was offering expert 
testimony. Nor did she exercise her right to retain her own "expert" to rebut that testimony. 
In sum, defendant has never stated what she would have done differently if she had received 
formal notice of Adair's testimony or how such notice would affected the outcome of the 
trial. 
Defendant claims that it is not her burden to show prejudice but, rather, the state's 
burden to show how a failure to explicitly apprise him of Adair's testimony did not create 
unfair prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant misconstrues the relevant law. Utah law does 
shift the prejudice burden to the State for discovery violations under some circumstances, but 
only after defendant first "make[s] a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have 
impaired the defense." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987); see also Arellano, 
964 P.2d at 1171. In Knight, the State disclosed to the defense that it planned to call two 
witnesses, but did not disclose the likely substance of their testimony, which had been 
learned through interviews with investigators. A few days before trial, the defendant asked if 
the witnesses had been located and was told, truthfully, that they had not. Knight, 734 P.2d 
at 915. Afterward, however, the State did locate the witnesses and arranged for them to 
testify at trial. Id. The defendant argued that these witnesses—one of whom testified that the 
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defendant had asked her to offer a false alibi—were completely unexpected and devastating 
to the defense. Id. at 915-16. 
In reversing defendant's conviction, the Utah Supreme Court focused on two factors. 
First, the defendant had no reason to expect the witnesses to testify. Second, defendant had 
no advance warning of the substance of their testimony. Because these factors created a 
credible argument that the failure to disclose impaired the defense, the court ruled that it 
should be up to the State to show why the defense was not prejudiced. Id. at 921. 
Neither of the factors identified by the Knight court are present here. Defendant knew 
that both Adair and Eberling would testify because they were on the witness list provided by 
the State. Defendant knew that one or both of them would testify about the significance of 
the quantities of the drugs. Because neither of the Knight factors are present, and because 
defendant had not made any argument as to how the alleged failure to disclose impaired her 
defense, her claim of prejudice fails. 
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe she would have prepared any 
differently if she had known the State planned to introduce this testimony through Chief 
Adair at trial instead Officer Eberling. In short, defendant has not articulated how her 
preparation or cross-examination of Chief Adair would have been any different or produced a 
different result. Accordingly, her claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's conviction 
be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of May, 2004 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant James Earl Bartlett challenges the district court's ruling 
that the arresting officers1 search of his car was incident to a 
lawful arrest. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Brown, 853 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/bartlett040804.htm 5/21/2004 
state v. rmrueu Fage lot 5 
P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). Under this provision, "[w]arrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." Id. "One such 
recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based 
upon probable cause under exigent circumstances." State v. Trane, 
2002 UT 97,522, 57 P.3d 1052. "'[A] search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification.1" Id. at 523 (quoting United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 477 (1973)). "A 
search of an automobile and its occupants pursuant to lawful arrest 
[is] proper even for a misdemeanor arrest." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 
1245, 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Here, Bartlett concedes that the initial stop was valid. Further, 
Bartlett was placed under arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, 
the search was contemporaneous with the arrest, and the search was of 
the passenger compartment of the automobile. The arresting officers 
thus needed no more justification to search the car, and the search 
was valid. 
Bartlettfs only argument that could be read to confront the search 
incident to arrest doctrine is that the officers had an alternative 
to searching the car--specifically, the officers could have turned 
the car over to BartlettTs mother, who was present at the time. 
Bartlettfs entire argument on this point consists of the statement 
that "[t]here was no need to search Bartlett!s vehicle since it could 
have been released to his mother." 
Bartlett has not offered any legal authority for the proposition that 
the presence of parties who are not implicated in any criminal 
activity negates the authority of the arresting officers to search 
the vehicle. Absent any legitimate ground upon which to reverse the 
district court's ruling regarding the validity of the search, we 
affirm.^ 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
http ://www. utcourts. go v/opinions/mds/bartlett040 8 04 .htm 5/21/2004 
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Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Notwithstanding the State's briefing of whether Bartlett received 
proper warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602 (1966), we decline to address the issue, which Bartlett 
seems not to have raised on appeal. 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/bartlett040804.htm 5/21/2004 
Addendum B 
U T ST § 58-37a-5 
U.C.A. 1953 §58-37a-5 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37a. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc./ a 
member of the LexisNexis Group. 
Current through 2003 First Special Session 
58-37a-5 Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, 
grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent 
to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug 
paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation 
of this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three years 
or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any 
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any 
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to 
promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who violates 
this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
U T ST § 58-37-2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
58-37-2 Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a 
controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, 
ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or 
research subject by: 
(i) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his 
authorized agent; or 
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction 
and in the presence of the practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf 
of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or 
practitioner but does not include a motor carrier, public 
warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, 
sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business 
trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union 
or groups of individuals associated in fact although not 
a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit 
entities created or maintained for the purpose of engaging 
in conduct which constitutes the commission of episodes of 
activity made unlawful by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 
37c, or 37d, which episodes are not isolated, but have the 
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, 
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the 
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and 
be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the 
placement of a drug, substance, or immediate precursor 
under Section 58-37-3. 
(e) (i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance 
included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 
58-37-4, and also includes a drug or substance included 
in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any 
controlled substance analog. 
ii) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as 
those terms are defined or used in Title 32A, 
regarding tobacco or food; 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease in man or other animals, which contains 
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or 
phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully 
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an 
over-the- counter medication without prescription; or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, 'minerals, herbs, 
or other similar substances including concentrates or 
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law, 
which may contain naturally occurring amounts of 
chemical or substances listed in this chapter, or in 
rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(f) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance 
the chemical structure of which is substantially similar 
to the chemical structure of a controlled substance 
listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, or in 
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system 
substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, 
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of controlled substances in the schedules set 
forth in this subsection; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, 
is represented or intended to have a stimulant, 
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system substantially similar to the 
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on 
the central nervous system of controlled substances 
in the schedules set forth in this subsection. 
(ii) Controlled substance analog does not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in 
Schedules I through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new 
drug application; 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is 
in effect for investigational use by a particular 
person under Section 505 of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the 
conduct with respect to the substance is permitted by 
the exemption; or 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for 
human consumption before an exemption takes effect 
with respect to the substance. 
(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease in man or other animals, which contains 
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or 
phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully 
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an 
over-the- counter medication without prescription. 
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, 
or other similar substances including concentrates or 
extracts, which are not otherwise regulated by law, 
which may contain naturally occurring amounts of 
chemical or substances listed in this chapter, or in 
rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by 
verdict, whether jury or bench, or plea, whether guilty or 
no contest, for any offense proscribed by Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense 
under the laws of the United States and any other state 
which, if committed in this state, would be an offense 
under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d. 
(h) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any 
substance that without authorization bears the 
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, 
imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of a 
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the 
person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, 
or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be 
a controlled substance distributed by, any other 
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be 
controlled substance. 
(i) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled 
substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an agency 
relationship exists. 
(j) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric 
acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical 
isomer of amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services or the Attorney General of the United 
States after investigation has found and by 
regulation designated habit-forming because of its 
stimulant effect on the central nervous system; or 
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance 
which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the 
Attorney General of the United States after 
investigation has found to have, and by regulation 
designated as having, a potential for abuse because of 
its depressant or stimulant effect on the central 
nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect. 
(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled 
substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to 
the lawful order or prescription of a practitioner, and 
includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, 
labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the 
substance for delivery. 
(m) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a 
controlled substance. 
(n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by 
administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a 
listed chemical. 
(o) "Distributor" means a person who distributes 
controlled substances. 
(p) "Drug" means: 
(i) articles recognized in the official United States 
Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the 
United States, or Official National Formulary, or any 
supplement to any of them; 
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man 
or other animals; 
(iii) articles, other than food, intended to affect the 
structure or function of man or other animals; and 
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any 
articles specified in Subsection (1) (p) (i) , (ii), or 
(iii); but does not include devices or their components, 
parts, or accessories. 
(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who 
unlawfully and habitually uses any controlled substance to 
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or 
who is so dependent upon the use of controlled substances 
as to have lost the power of self-control with reference 
to his dependency. 
(r) "Food" means: 
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or 
animal origin other than a drug as specified in this 
chapter, and normally ingested by human beings; and 
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason 
of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other 
condition including but not limited to the conditions of 
disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, 
hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; 
uses for supplying a particular dietary need which exist 
by reason of age including but not limited to the ages 
of infancy and childbirth, and also uses for 
supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual 
diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary 
property for use of a food. Any particular use of a food 
is a special dietary use regardless of the nutritional 
purposes. 
(s) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the 
Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and 
by regulation designated as being, the principal compound 
used or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of 
a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture 
of a controlled substance, the control of which is 
necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of 
the controlled substance. 
(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, 
propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled 
substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction 
from substances of natural origin, or independently by 
means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis. 
(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, 
repackages, or labels any container of any controlled 
substance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound 
prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis 
and all parts of the genus, whether growing or not; the 
seeds of it; the resin extracted from any part of the 
plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. 
The term does not include the mature stalks of the plant, 
fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the 
seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, 
except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, 
or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of 
germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other 
species of the genus cannabis which are chemically 
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also 
included. 
(w) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of 
the United States or any foreign country. 
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether 
produced directly or indirectly by extraction from 
substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means 
of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis: 
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or 
preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(iii) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, or preparation of the substance, which is 
chemically identical with any of the substances referred 
to in Subsection (l)(x)(i), (ii), or (iii), except 
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves 
or extracts of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine 
or ecgonine. 
(y) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an 
unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are 
legally transferable to another party by endorsement or 
delivery. 
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an 
addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability 
similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a 
drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining 
liability. 
(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver 
somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(bb) "Person" means any corporation, association, 
partnership, trust, other institution or entity or one or 
more individuals. 
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of 
the opium poppy, after mowing. 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual 
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, 
belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished 
from distribution, of controlled substances and includes 
individual, joint, or group possession or use of 
controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or 
user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he 
be shown to have individually possessed, used, or 
controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is 
shown that the person jointly participated with one or 
more persons in the use, possession, or control of any 
substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, 
or the controlled substance is found in a place or under 
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
(ee) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, 
pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, 
or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct 
research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching 
or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course 
of professional practice or research in this state. 
(ff) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or 
in writing. 
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed 
practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's 
professional practice, for a controlled substance, other 
drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use 
by a patient or an animal. The order may be issued by word 
of mouth, written document, telephone, facsimile 
transmission, computer, or other electronic means of 
communication as defined by rule. 
(hh) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, 
cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled 
substance. 
(ii) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other 
evidences of debt or of property. 
(jj) "State" means the state of Utah. 
(kk) "Ultimate user" means any' person who lawfully 
possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the 
use of a member of his household, or for administration to 
an animal owned by him or a member of his household. 
(2) If a terra used in this chapter is not defined, the 
definition and terms of Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall 
apply. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29, § 3; 1979, ch. 
12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982, ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 
60; 1991, ch. 198, § 1; 1992, ch. 121, § 1; 1994, ch. 132, § 
2; 1996, ch. 170, § 53; 1996, ch. 294, § 1; 1997, ch. 64, § 2; 
2003, ch. 131, § 40. 
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58-37-8 Prohibited acts —Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A --Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with 
intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or 
more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person 
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other 
position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in 
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree 
felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of 
Subsection (1)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his 
person or in his immediate possession during the commission 
or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the 
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(1) (a) (iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B --Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess' or 
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance,/ 
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or'order/! 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control 
of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or 
other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or 
distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess 
an altered or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2) (a) (i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is 
guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana^ 
if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 
pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a 
third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an 
extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the amount 
is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of 
confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree 
greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession 
of any controlled substance by a person, that person shall 
be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided 
in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than 
one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the 
person is guilty of a third degree felony, 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2) (a) (ii) or (2) (a) (iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under 
Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a 
violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and 
intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a 
controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 
in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as 
defined in Section 76- 1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C --Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution 
of a controlled substance a license number which is 
fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person 
or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person 
known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, 
or to procure the administration of any controlled substance 
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose 
his receiving any controlled substance from another source, 
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or 
the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or 
to alter any prescription or written order issued or written 
under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, 
stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or 
reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any 
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so 
as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D —Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act 
declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon 
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or 
on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those 
schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or 
other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the 
act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation 
center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined 
in Section 76- 10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, 
theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure 
adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 
years of age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is 
guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for 
a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree felony 
but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under 
Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4) (a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was 
as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section 
is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or 
administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the 
same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, 
evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the 
character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only 
and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the 
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly 
under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled 
Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application 
of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, § 1; 1977, ch. 
29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 
196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 
95, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 1990, ch. 
161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 
80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, § 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 
284, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 6; 1998, ch. 
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1; 2003, ch. 
10, § 1; 2003, ch. 33, § 6. 
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 
1998, deleted former Subsection (6) which read: "Any person 
who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree 
less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense," 
redesignating the other subsections accordingly. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 3, 1999, 
substituted "in the immediate presence of" for "with" in 
Subsection (4)(a)(x) and made minor stylistic changes in 
Subsections (2) and (4). 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective May 3, 1999, 
added Subsection (l)(c), redesignating former Subsection 
(1)(c) as (1)(d), substituted "chapter" for "subsection" in 
Subsection (2)(a)(i), and made a minor stylistic change. 
The 2003 amendment by ch. 10, effective May 5, 2003, added 
Subsection (2)(g) and made a related change. 
The 2003 amendment by ch. 33, effective May 5, 2003, added 
"gamma hydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III" in 
Subsection (1)(b)(i), making a related change; added 
"controlled substances analog or a" in Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
and substituted "or on the grounds of a house of worship as 
defined in Section 76-10-501" for "a church or synagogue" in 
Subsection (4)(a)(vi). 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Cross-References. --Cities and towns, prohibitions of 
sales of narcotics to minors, § 10-8-47. 
Abuse of psychotoxic chemical solvents, § 76-10-107. 
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 
76-3-301. 
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77-17-13 Expert testimony generally --Notice requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any 
expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, 
excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call 
the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days 
before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, 
the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony 
sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare 
to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively 
consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible 
for any fee charged by the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in 
whole or part on the results of any tests or other specialized 
data, the party intending to call the witness shall provide to 
the opposing party the information upon request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's 
report or the information concerning the expert's proposed 
testimony, the party receiving notice shall provide to the other 
party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to 
rebut the expert's testimony, including rhe information required 
under Subsection (1)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to 
substantially comply with the requirements of this section, the 
opposing party shall, if necessary to prsvent substantial 
prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing 
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this 
section is the result of bad faith on the part of any party 
or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The 
remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if 
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the 
provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert 
at a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert jj 
the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's 
proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to 
by the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the 
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy 
of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to 
trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an 
expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is 
an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long 
as the opposing party is on reasonable rotice through genera^ 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S Govt. Works 
discovery that the expert may be calleShas a witness ""at* trial7 
and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with 
the opposing party upon reasonable notice*1 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 139, § 3; 
1999, ch. 43, § 1; 2003, ch. 290, § 2. 
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NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. —The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
inserted "held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure" in Subsection (1)(a); divided Subsections (1) to (4), 
adding (a) and (b) designations; made two stylistic changes in 
Subsection (3)(a); and added Subsection (5). 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsections 
(l)(b), (2), and (3); substituted "fails to substantially complj 
with" for flfails to meet" and inserted "if necessary to prevent 
substantial prejudice" in Subsection (4)(a); and added the 
second sentence in Subsection (4)(b) and Subsection (6). 
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